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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from the district court sitting in its intermediate appellate capacity. Below,
the district court conducted a judicial review of the Bonner County Board of Commissioners’
(“Board”) decision to grant applicant, Stejer’s, Inc., three variances from applicable lot setbacks
required by the Bonner County Revised Code (“BCRC”). Neighboring land owners, Frank P.
Hungate and Thomas K. Hungate, as Trustees of The Hungate Trust, the A&E Family L.L.C.,
Anne E. Ashburn, Eleanor Jones, Frank Hungate, and John Hungate (collectively, the “Hungates”),
petitioned the district court for judicial review and now appeal the decision of the district court
affirming the Board.
B. Course of the Proceedings.
On February 3, 2017, Stejer’s, Inc. filed application V-486-17 seeking three variances from
applicable setbacks (“Variances”). R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 218–39. The Variances were filed to bring
Stejer’s, Inc.’s illegal non-conforming structures and uses into compliance.
The Bonner County Planning and Zoning Commission (“PZC”) denied the Variances.
R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 476–82. Stejer’s, Inc. appealed to the Board. R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 527–28. On
June 21, 2017, the Board held a public hearing and voted to grant the Variances. R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp.
170–74. On June 22, 2017, the Board issued its written decision granting the Variances
(“Decision”). R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 468–75. On September 18, 2017, the Hungates timely filed a
Petition for Judicial Review. R. Vol. 1, pp. 8–11. On October 23, 2017, Stejer’s, Inc. intervened
in the judicial review action. R. Vol. 1, pp. 26–29. Following briefing, the district court heard oral
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argument on April 9, 2018. On May 5, 2018, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision
and Order on Petition for Review (“Memorandum Decision”) denying the Hungates’ petition and
affirming the Board’s Decision. R. Vol. 1, pp. 168–85. On May 13, 2018, the district court entered
a Judgment affirming the Board’s Decision. R. Vol. 1, pp. 186–89. On June 28, 2018, the Hungates
timely filed their Notice of Appeal to this Court. R. Vol. 1, pp. 190–216.
C.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Property overview.

Stejer’s, Inc. owns three parcels at the north end of Priest Lake: (1) Tax Parcel 2, (2) Tax
Parcel 9, and (3) Tax Parcel 10. R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 266, 447. Stejer’s, Inc.’s parcels are depicted
on the Site Plan inserted herein. 1 All three parcels are zoned Rural-5, which allows one dwelling
unit per five acres. R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 267; BCRC § 12-411. Although not depicted on the Site Plan,
a three-bedroom house is located on Tax Parcel 2. R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 448. A six-bedroom duplex
with an attached lean-to structure is located partially on Tax Parcel 9 and partially on Tax Parcel
10 (“Green Building”). R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 444. A two-bedroom house (“Yellow Building”) and a
three-bedroom house (“Beige Building”) are located on Tax Parcel 10. R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 444.
Stejer’s, Inc. has five dwelling units where only three are allowed in the zone. R. R. Vol. 1, Ex. p.
444. Stejer’s, Inc. accesses its property via Thistledo Lane, a private easement over the Hungates’

1

The Site Plan (R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 247) was provided to the County with Stejer’s, Inc.’s application for the Variances.
Petitioner includes the Site Plan as a general depiction of the lot lines and building sizes and locations on Tax Parcels 9
and 10. However, the Site Plan’s labels of the structures as a “1-bedroom house”, “2-bedroom house” and
“storage/shop” are not accurate and not supported by the Record on appeal. Further, the Site Plan does not show the
residential structure located on Tax Parcel 2.
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land. R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 219. The Hungates’ property is located to the east of Stejer’s Inc.’s property.
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 27, l. 11–p. 28, l. 5.
Stejer’s, Inc. requested setback variances for the Green Building on Tax Parcel 9 and for
the Beige Building on Tax Parcel 10. R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 264. Tax Parcel 9 and Tax Parcel 10 were
illegally developed as described
Be!:!: C. ;Jf°J
Plc.:u:u_:; ... ~-n~o!ll

in the following sections.
2. Tax Parcel 9.

PROPOSID BOUNDARY
l,INE Ao..AJSTMENT

Tax Parcel 9 is 0.28 acres
and was described and conveyed
to Stejer’s, Inc. in a 1967 deed.

EXISTING
6' REAR YARO

SETBAr.K
IWIER£ 25' IS

R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 219, 470, 474.
In 1980, Bonner County adopted

REQUIRED

LE.\CHflEl.D

its zoning ordinance and setback
TAX2
(NOT A PART)

minimums. R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 470.
Nineteen years later, in 1999,
Stejer’s, Inc. constructed the
Green Building, a 35’X75’ twostory structure that straddles the

RECORD PAGBf_ji_

boundary between Tax Parcel 9 and Tax Parcel 10. R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 296, 416; see Site Plan.
Stejer’s, Inc.’s 1999 building location permit for the Green Building described the structure as a

APPELLANTS’ BRIEF - 3

“Garage + Storage”, which was planned and approved with a 25-foot front yard setback. R. Vol.
1, Ex. p. 457.
As built, however, the Green Building has a 17-foot front yard setback, no side yard
setback, a five-foot rear yard setback, and is out of compliance with the building permit and the
County’s zoning ordinance. R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 265; R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 270 (wherein the Bonner County
staff concluded: “Therefore … [Stejer’s, Inc.] willfully altered the location of the [Green
Building], making it non-compliant…”). At the time Stejer’s, Inc. constructed the Green Building,
the BCRC imposed a 25-foot front yard setback, a 5-foot side yard setback, a 25-foot rear yard
setback for residential structures, and a 5-foot rear yard setback for non-residential structures.
R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 281. In the 1999 building location permit and in a 2007 building location permit,
Stejer’s, Inc. represented to the County that the Green Building was located entirely within Tax
Parcel 9, which is false. R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 458.
Despite permitting the Green Building for non-residential storage use, Stejer’s, Inc.
converted the Green Building to a residential dwelling without authorization and without obtaining
septic permits. R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 223-24, 268, 444–45.
In 2015, Stejer’s, Inc. described the Green Building as a multifamily “duplex with a total
of 6 bedrooms.” R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 448. In connection with the Variances, Stejer’s, Inc. proposed a
lot line adjustment to place the Green Building entirely within Tax Parcel 9. R. at 281; see also
Site Plan.
In summary, Stejer’s, Inc. violated setbacks for Tax Parcel 9, constructed the Green
Building in violation of the applicable zoning codes and permits, illegally converted the Green
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Building to a residential use without necessary permits, and placed two residential units on Tax
Parcel 9 where only one is allowed under the BCRC.
3. Tax Parcel 10.
Tax Parcel 10 is 0.22 acres and was described and conveyed to Stejer’s, Inc. in 1971.
R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 219, 233–35. In addition to a portion of the Green Building, Stejer’s, Inc.
constructed two additional structures on Tax Parcel 10: (1) the Beige Building and (2) the Yellow
Building. In 1997, without any permits, Stejer’s, Inc. constructed the Beige Building, a 30’X40’
two-story structure. R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 142. When Stejer’s, Inc. first constructed the Beige Building,
it was located partially outside of Tax Parcel 10 and encroached on the Thistledo Lane private road
easement. R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 434. Stejer’s, Inc. confirmed this encroachment in a letter to Frank
Hungate stating: “We [Stejer’s, Inc.] agree that the SW Corner of our new 30X40 foot garage is
on the private road approximately 1½ feet and then [sic] we need a 5-foot setback.” R. Vol. 1, Ex.
p. 434. Stejer’s, Inc. moved the Beige Building six feet off the side yard boundary and seven feet
off the front yard boundary, still in violation of the BCRC’s 25-foot front yard setback for nonresidential structures. R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 265, 270. Soon after completion of the Beige Building as
a “garage”, Stejer’s, Inc. converted the two-story structure into a three-bedroom residential
dwelling without any authorization or septic permits. R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 444–45, 447–48.
In 2015, Bonner County notified Stejer’s, Inc. that Tax Parcel 10 was in violation of the
applicable setbacks. R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 142, 474 (“Tax-10 had a zoning violation ZV-259-97
concerning building setback, stating clearly the front yard setback is 25 feet.”).
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Stejer’s, Inc. constructed the Yellow Building, a 20’X30’ single story structure, then
moved it to different locations on the property throughout the years, placing it in its current location
on Tax Parcel 10 in approximately 1997. R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 290, 394, 416. Stejer’s, Inc. has used
the Yellow Building as a residential two-bedroom bunkhouse. R. at 227, 416. The record does not
include any evidence of building permits for the Yellow Building; no septic permits were obtained.
R., pp. 223-24.
In sum, Stejer’s, Inc. violated setbacks for Tax Parcel 10, constructed two structures
without obtaining necessary permits and placed two residences on Tax Parcel 10 where only one
is allowed under the BCRC.
4. Stejer’s, Inc.’s health department violations.
On December 22, 2015, Panhandle Health Department sent a Notice of Violation to
Stejer’s, Inc. for construction of residential homes on Tax Parcels 9 and 10 without obtaining
necessary septic permits and approvals. R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 444–45. On February 5, 2016, Panhandle
Health Department and Stejer’s, Inc. entered into a Consent Order. R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 447–48.
To bring Tax Parcels 9 and 10 into compliance, Panhandle Health Department has required
Stejer’s, Inc. to: (1) convert the Green Building from a six-bedroom duplex to a one-bedroom
single-family residence; (2) convert the Beige Building from a three-bedroom dwelling to a twobedroom dwelling; and (3) convert the Yellow Building from a two-bedroom bunkhouse to a
storage building. R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 448. Attached to the Consent Order are Stejer’s, Inc.’s
construction plans to implement these corrective actions. R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 451–55.
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5. The Variances.
Stejer’s, Inc. sought the Variances to obtain legal authorization to convert the Green
Building and the Beige Building to residential structures and to have its construction plans
approved by the County. R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 276. As to the Green Building on Tax Parcel 9, Stejer’s,
Inc. sought: (1) a six-foot rear yard setback where 25 feet is required, and (2) a 17-foot front yard
setback were 25 feet is required. R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 218. As to the Beige Building on Tax Parcel
10, Stejer’s, Inc. sought: (1) a seven-foot front yard setback where 25 feet is required. R. Vol. 1,
Ex. pp. 218.
The following table summarizes facts related to each structure on Tax Parcels 9 and 10:
Structure

Location

Actual Use

Permitted Use

Variances
Sought

Green
Building

Partially on
Tax Parcel 9
and partially
on Tax Parcel
10

6-bedroom residential
duplex, built as
“storage” and
converted without
permit

Non-residential;
non-compliant
with building
permit and no
septic permits
obtained

17’ front yard
setback where 25’
required; 6’ rear
setback where 25’
required

Beige
Building

Tax Parcel 10

3-bedroom residential
dwelling, built as
“garage” and
converted without
permit

No building or
septic permits
obtained

7’ front yard
setback where 25’
required

Yellow
Building

Tax Parcel 10

2-bedroom residential
dwelling
(“bunkhouse”)

Unknown as to
building permits;
no septic permits
obtained

None
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Bonner County staff recommended denial of the Variances, and the PZC denied the
Variances, because staff and the PZC concluded the Variances did not meet the applicable
standards in the BCRC § 12-234. R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 278–79, 281, 476.
Petitioner and County citizens argued for denial of the Variances due to: (1) increased
intensity of use and density beyond that contemplated in an R-5 zone (R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 336);
(2) increased traffic volumes on Thistledo Lane used for vehicle and pedestrian access and youth
recreation (R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 336, 341, 394, 412); (3) excessive lot coverage and unsightly
architecture out of character with the surroundings (R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 336, 338, 394); (4) reduced
privacy (R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 395, 412); (5) safety concerns (R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 412); (6) reduced
property values (R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 412); (7) reduced enjoyment of wildlife and scenic views found
on Priest Lake (R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 341, 401); and (8) impacts on adjacent wetlands and the water
quality of Priest Lake (R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 341, 401, 412; R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 148-49). Ultimately, the
Board approved the Variances, concluding, without support, that the application met the standards
in BCRC § 12-234.
6.

Judicial Review.

On judicial review, the district court concluded that the Board committed several errors in
approving the Variances (R. Vol. 1, pp. 178–79) but that the Hungates failed to demonstrate that
they were prejudiced by the Board’s Decision made in error. R. Vol. 1, pp. 179–83. Thus, the
district court affirmed the Board’s Decision.
II.
A.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Did the Board commit reversible error in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3)?
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B.

Were the Hungates prejudiced by Bonner County’s erroneous Decision approving the
Variances?

C.

Did the district court err in concluding the Hungates were not the prevailing party and by
failing to award the Hungates attorney fees and costs under I.C. § 12-117?

D.

Are the Hungates entitled to attorney fees and costs under I.C. § 12-117 on appeal?
III.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

As set forth in the Argument section below, the Hungates are entitled to attorney fees and
costs on appeal under I.A.R. 40 and 41 and I.C. § 12-117.
IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Idaho’s Local Land Use Planning Act, I.C. § 67-6501 et seq. (“LLUPA”), allows judicial
review by the district court of an approval of certain land use applications by affected persons
pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, I.C. § 67-5201 et seq. (“IDAPA”). In re
Jerome Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 153 Idaho 298, 307, 281 P.3d 1076, 1085 (2012). Where a board of
county commissioners makes a land use decision, it will be treated as a government agency under
IDAPA. Id. This Court reviews the district court’s decision on judicial review “as a matter of
procedure.” 917 Lusk, LLC v. City of Boise, 158 Idaho 12, 14, 343 P.3d 41, 43 (2015) (quotations
omitted). On appeal from the district court, this Court conducts “an independent review of the
agency record.” Id. “This Court will affirm a district court’s decision upholding a zoning board’s
action unless the party contesting the zoning board’s decision demonstrates that (1) the board erred
in a manner specified in Idaho Code section 67-5279(3), and (2) the board’s action prejudiced its
substantial rights.” Id. Idaho Code § 67–5279(3) provides that the board’s action may be reversed
if the board’s “findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of constitutional
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or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon
unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” I.C. § 67-5279(3). Where error and prejudice
are demonstrated, the zoning board’s decision “shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded
for further proceedings as necessary.” Id.
V.

ARGUMENT

The record supports, and the Hungates have established, both error and prejudice as
required under IDAPA to set aside the Board’s Decision. In this appeal, the Hungates do not
challenge the district court’s decision as to error; the Hungates only challenge the district court’s
decision as to prejudice.
A.

It is undisputed that the Board committed several reversible errors under I.C.
§ 67-5279(3) in its Decision to approve of the Variances.
On judicial review, the Hungates set forth nine errors committed by the Board. R. Vol. 1

pp. 85–105. 2 Bonner County did not rebut any of these errors, and Stejer’s, Inc. only partially
rebutted some. R. Vol. 1, pp. 177–78. Relying on Estes v. Barry, 132 Idaho 82, 87, 967 P.2d 284,
289 (1998), for the proposition that “a party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or

2

Specifically, the Hungates provided argument and authority that the Board’s Decision was made in error because:
(1) the Decision violated I.C. § 67-6516; (2) the Decision violated BCRC § 12-234; (3) Stejer’s, Inc. failed to
demonstrate the criteria for a variance were met under I.C. § 67-6516; (4) the Decision fails to comply with the written
decision requirements of I.C. § 67-6535; (5) the Decision, specifically the finding that Stejer’s, Inc.’s actions did not
cause the alleged hardship, is not supported by substantial evidence; (6) the Decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion because undisputed evidence established that Stejer’s, Inc. caused the alleged hardship on the
property; (7) the Decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion because the Board ignored evidence
establishing that Stejer’s, Inc. caused the alleged hardship; (8) the Decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion because the Board applied irrelevant standards to grant the Variances; (9) the Decision was arbitrary
capricious, or an abuse of discretion because the Board considered and relied on irrelevant personal statements offered
by the Stejers in granting the Variance.
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argument is lacking”, the district court properly held that Bonner County and Stejer’s, Inc. waived
the argument that the Variances were not granted in error. R. Vol. 1, pp. 177–78 (“[The Hungates]
have established that the Board’s decision was in error based on their uncontested assignments of
error”).
The district court also concluded that even if the error argument was not waived, the
Hungates showed the Board committed error in granting the Variances for two reasons: (i) the
Decision was made in violation of the applicable statute, BCRC § 12-234, because Stejer’s, Inc.’s
illegal construction of the Green Building and the Beige Building was the cause of the need for
the Variance, a reversible error under I.C. § 67-5279(3)(a); and (ii) the Decision was not supported
by substantial evidence because the record clearly showed Stejer’s, Inc.’s illegal actions gave rise
to the need for the Variance, a reversible error under I.C. § 67-5279(3)(d). R. Vol. 1, pp. 178–79.
The district court did not address the Hungates’ arguments that the Board’s Decision was
also arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The Hungates maintain that the Decision was
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion for the reasons set forth in their briefing to the
district court. See R. Vol. 1, pp. 97–104. The only remaining issue is whether the Board’s
uncontested errors prejudiced the Hungates.
B.

The Board’s Decision granting the Variances prejudiced the Hungates’ substantial
rights, and the district court erred in holding that the Hungates failed to show
prejudice.
To set the Board’s Decision aside, I.C. § 67-5279(4) requires the Hungates to show the

Decision potentially prejudices the Hungates’ substantial rights. Lusk, 158 Idaho at 19, 343 P.3d
at 48 (“real or potential prejudice” is sufficient). Whether a petitioner’s substantial rights are
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prejudiced is a “case-by-case” determination because “each procedural irregularity, legal error,
and discretionary decision is different and can affect the petitioner in varying ways.” Hawkins v.
Bonneville Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 232, 254 P.3d 1224, 1228 (2011). To show
prejudice “[t]he petitioner opposing a permit must be in jeopardy of suffering substantial harm if
the project goes forward, such as a reduction in the opponent’s land value or interference with his
or her use or ownership of the land.” Id. at 233, 254 P.3d at 1229 (citing Price v. Payette Cty. Bd.
of Cty. Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 431, 958 P.2d 583, 588 (1998)).
When analyzing whether rights are potentially prejudiced, it is “instructive to look to law
relating to property rights, nuisance, and trespass…” Id. Prejudice under I.C. § 67-5279(4) is
analyzed by looking at the entire record before the Board. Lusk, 158 Idaho at 19, 343 P.3d at 48
(reversing the district court’s decision affirming the Boise City Council’s decision to grant a
conditional use permit because there was error and “[t]he record before the Commission set[] forth
substantial evidence supporting [Petitioner’s] claim of potential prejudice to its substantial
rights”).
1.

The district court erred by analyzing prejudice to the Hungates using the current
illegal and non-conforming status of Stejer’s, Inc.’s property as the baseline.

The district court incorrectly analyzed the prejudice to the Hungates caused by the
Variances. This is because the district court analyzed prejudice to the Hungates without taking into
account the fact that Stejer’s, Inc.’s structures and uses are illegal, non-conforming, and should
not be there in the first place and would not be there without the Variances.
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For instance, in finding that the Hungates failed to show prejudice based on interference
with use and enjoyment, the district court reasoned: “[the Hungates] have failed to show how
granting the variance will affect their use of their property given that these structures have been in
place for 20 years.” R. Vol. 1, p. 183. Similarly, as to a reduction in property value caused by the
Variances, the district court reasoned: “It is important to note that these structures have been in
place for at least 20 years; if the structures have negatively impacted [the Hungates’] property
values since their construction, [the Hungates] should be able to show a reduction in value…”
R. Vol. 1, p. 181.
The district court’s analysis looked at the current illegal non-conforming status of Stejer’s,
Inc.’s property and then asked whether granting the Variance, which would allow the same illegal
non-conforming status to continue, would cause prejudice. This type of analysis would never result
in prejudice because it is comparing the same thing and does not take into account the effect of the
Variance. The proper analysis is to ask whether a variance causes real or potential prejudice when
compared with a legal and conforming use on the subject property.
Prior to the Board’s Decision, Stejer’s, Inc. was subject to a building location permit
violation and a zoning violation notice that would require the property to be brought into
conformance with the County’s zoning ordinance. R. Vol. 1, pp. 153–54. 3 Therefore, without the
Variances, Stejer’s, Inc.’s illegal structures and uses would need to be terminated or brought into

3

At the public hearing before the Planning and Zoning Commission, where the Variances were properly denied, staff
confirmed for the Commission that Stejer’s, Inc.’s property was subject to a building location and zoning violation
notice. See R. Vol. 1 Ex. pp. 26–27.
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conformance with LLUPA and the BCRC. See Wohrle v. Kootenai Cty., 147 Idaho 267, 276, 207
P.3d 998, 1007 (2009) (holding that illegal and non-conforming docks built in setbacks had to be
removed and that denial of a variance to bring the docks into conformance did not prejudice the
landowners because they “were not making lawful use of their properties when they built within
the setback areas without first receiving a variance or building permit.”). Furthermore, the district
court’s reliance on the illegal “long-existing situation” on Stejer’s, Inc.’s property to find no
prejudice is improper because the same facts that demonstrate the Decision violated the
ordinance—i.e., the prior improper and illegal construction of the structures—was also the district
court’s basis for claiming there is no new harm arising from the Decision.
The district court’s conclusion of no harm based on the pre-existence of Stejer’s, Inc.’s
illegal structures appears to be based on the district court’s misapplication of Hawkins. This case
is not analogous to Hawkins, and Hawkins does not stand for the proposition that a variance for an
existing illegal structure cannot cause prejudice. In Hawkins, the landowner and applicant, the
Meyers, sought a lot frontage variance for two legal non-conforming lots accessed by a spur road
crossing the petitioner’s open grazing land. 151 Idaho at 230, 254 P.3d at 1226. The petitioner
argued the variance prejudiced him because it would result in additional use of the spur road on
his land. Id. at 151 Idaho 232, 254 P.3d at 1228. Bonneville County argued the petitioner could
not show prejudice because the variance “merely allows the Meyers to continue using the property
for dwelling sites as they always have.” Id. This, however, was not the basis for the Hawkins
Court’s finding of no prejudice. The Hawkins Court concluded the petitioner failed to demonstrate
prejudice because the nature of the spur road was unadjudicated. Id. at 151 Idaho at 233–34, 254
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P.3d at 1229–30 (“Hawkins … cannot show prejudice … because no court has adjudicated the
easement rights the Meyers might have in the spur road …. Further, there was evidence produced
before the Board that the spur road may actually be a public right-of-way, in which case Hawkins
would have certainly suffered no harm.”). Another key distinguishing fact in Hawkins was that the
structures at issue there were legal conforming (i.e., grandfathered in), and no variance was even
required for the Meyers’ project. Id. at 230, 254 P.3d at 1226. Conversely, in this case, Stejer’s
Inc.’s structures were illegally constructed under the applicable zoning codes and permits and not
grandfathered in. Furthermore, Bonner County and Panhandle Health Department each issued
violation notices to Stejer’s, Inc. that could only be resolved by the Decision to grant the Variances.
Without the Variances, the illegal structures could not stay in place.
This Court should find that the district court’s analysis was fundamentally flawed because
it analyzed prejudice to the Hungates based on Stejer’s, Inc.’s pre-existing illegal structures and
uses.
2.

The Board’s Decision granting the Variances prejudiced the Hungates’ substantial
rights and the district court erred in concluding otherwise.

The Decision to grant the Variances substantially harms the Hungates by devaluing their
property and interfering with their use and enjoyment on their property. See Hawkins, 151 Idaho
at 233, 254 P.3d at 1229 (holding that that prejudice, i.e., “jeopardy of suffering substantial harm”,
can include a reduction in land value or interference with use or ownership).
Substantial evidence was presented to the Board that granting the Variances would have
significant prejudicial impacts on the Hungates’ property. On judicial review, the Hungates
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compiled this evidence for the district court. See R. Vol. 1, p. 83 (summarizing evidence before
the Board). This evidence showed that approval of the Variances results in: (1) increased intensity
of use; (2) increased traffic volumes on Thistledo Lane; (3) excessive lot coverage and unsightly
architecture out of character with the surroundings; (4) reduced privacy; (5) safety concerns;
(6) reduced property values; and (7) reduced enjoyment of wildlife and scenic views found on
Priest Lake. R. Vol. 1, pp. 336, 341, 394, 396, 401, 402-03, 412.
The Variances allow structures that are significantly larger than those that could be legally
built outside of the setbacks. Larger structures accommodate more people, more people means
more cars and more vehicle trips over the Hungates’ land on Thistledo Lane. Each of these negative
effects supports the conclusion that the Variances will prejudice the Hungates because they have
the effect of devaluing and interfering with the use and enjoyment of their property.
Understanding the consequences of denying the Variances highlights how the Board’s
Decision to erroneously approve them prejudices the Hungates. Without the Variances, the number
and size of structures on Stejer’s, Inc.’s property cannot continue. Given the overbuilt condition
of the Stejer’s, Inc.’s small parcels, with more residential units than are allowed and significant
encroachment of two different two-story structures into the setbacks, to bring the property into
compliance, Stejer’s, Inc. will have to reduce the size of and/or remove some structures. For
example, the Green Building is encroaching 19 feet into the setback on the west side. See Site Plan.
To correct the illegal placement, Stejer’s, Inc. cannot simply move the Green Building back to the
east because there is no room. The Green Building will have to be redesigned. Similarly, the Beige
Building is encroaching 15 feet into the setback on the east side (where the Hungates’ property is).
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To correct the illegal placement, Stejer’s, Inc. cannot simply move the Beige Building back to the
west because the Yellow Building (another unauthorized residential structure on the same lot) is
in the way. The structures will need to be removed and/or reduced in size.
Stejer’s, Inc. cannot deny it created the problem or argue that it is too burdensome to
correct. The burden on Stejer’s, Inc. is irrelevant. The County Code expressly disallows variances
to applicants who caused the need for the variance. BCRC § 12-234 (requiring that the “special
conditions and circumstances” warranting a variance “do not result from the actions of the
applicant”). Because Stejer’s, Inc. is not entitled to a variance to correct its own wrongs, it has to
remove the structures regardless of any cost or inconvenience. See Wohrle v. Kootenai Cty.,
147 Idaho at 276, 207 P.3d at 1007.
The significant amount of work needed to correct these wrongs illustrates the extent of
prejudice to the Hungates by the Board’s erroneous Decision to allow these illegal structures to
remain. As described in the record, the overbuilt and encroaching structures block views and light,
crowd out wildlife, add more traffic, and create an unattractive property that negatively impacts
the value and enjoyment of the Hungates’ adjacent property. R. Vol. 1, p. 83.
Setbacks protect property values and the use and enjoyment of one’s property. An
infringement into setbacks is, therefore, evidence of a reduction of property values and
diminishment of use and enjoyment. As described in Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning
§ 53:4 (4th ed.), 4 setback minimums conserve property values and promote aesthetic and

4

Setbacks are considered by courts to promote a variety of public purposes. They are held to relate
to provision for light and air, fire protection, traffic safety, prevention of overcrowding, rest and
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psychological values. See R. Vol. 1, p. 150. The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized the
inherent property value and aesthetic benefits bestowed by zoning setbacks, which:
[A]fford room for lawns and trees, keep the dwellings farther from the dust, noise,
and fumes of the street, add to the attractiveness and comfort of a residential district,
create a better home environment, and, by securing a greater distance between
houses on opposite sides of the street, reduce the fire hazard; that the projection of
a building beyond the front line of the adjacent dwellings cuts off light and air from
them, and, by interfering with the view of street corners, constitutes a danger in the
operation of automobiles.
Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 609 (1927).
To show prejudice, specific evidence of property valuation from an appraiser or other
expert evidence is not required. 5 This Court has taken a common sense approach to recognizing
prejudice based on impacts to property value or the use and enjoyment of property. For example,
in Price, the Court found that Payette County erred in amending its comprehensive plan and that
“[t]he Board’s actions result in a lack of orderly growth within the county, thereby diminishing
[petitioner’s] property value and hampering his use and enjoyment of his land.” Price, 131 Idaho
at 431, 958 P.2d at 588. Similarly, in Lusk, the Court held that petitioner adequately showed
prejudice to a substantial right based on claims in the record that inadequate parking in the area
next to their business would be exacerbated by the conditional use permit. Lusk, 158 Idaho at 19,

recreation, solving drainage problems, protecting the appearance and character of a neighborhood,
conserving property values, and may, in particular cases, promote a variety of aesthetic and
physiological values as well as ecological and environmental interests.
3 Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning § 53:4 (4th ed.)
5

The district court’s Memorandum Decision incorrectly states that prejudice is shown by establishing “substantial
economic harm.” R. Vol. 1, p. 180. That is incorrect. Substantial economic harm does not need to be shown under
Hawkins or Lusk.
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343 P.3d at 48; see also In re Variance ZV2011-2, 156 Idaho 491, 497, 328 P.3d 471, 477 (2014)
(stating in dicta that a subdivision approval taking access over the petitioner’s servient estate
arguably prejudices his substantial rights).
Like Price and Lusk, the lack of orderly development and the increased intensity of use
and traffic immediately adjacent to or on the Hungates’ property caused by the Variances makes
it less enjoyable, less usable, less marketable, less appealing, and less valuable. Testimony to the
Board stated this same position: “[S]etbacks serve many important purposes like safety … privacy,
property values and density control just to name a few.” R. Vol. 1, p. 421. The record plainly
demonstrates that the Variances allow structures to be located in setbacks. The Hungates’ citations
to the record and legal authorities show that reduced setbacks have the potential to cause a
prejudice because the setbacks themselves provide property value and material property rights.
Deprivation of such property rights is precisely the type of harm the Hawkins Court held should
be considered when determining prejudice. 151 Idaho at 233, 254 P.3d at 1229.
Stejer’s, Inc. has significantly overbuilt its property in a manner that increases the intensity
of use beyond what is allowed by the BCRC and encroaches into setbacks. This intensity of use
and reduction of setbacks negatively impacts the Hungates’ use and enjoyment of their property
and the value of their property. Accordingly, the erroneous grant of the Variances prejudices the
Hungates’ substantial rights. The district court should be reversed, and the Board’s Decision
should be overturned because it was made in error and prejudices the Hungates.
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C.

The district court erred in concluding that the Hungates were not the prevailing
party, and the Hungates are entitled to their attorney fees and costs before the district
court under I.C. § 12-117.
The Hungates are entitled to their attorney fees and costs under I.C. § 12-117 because the

Board issued the Decision without a reasonable basis in fact or law and, as established above, the
Hungates should have been the prevailing party in the judicial review before the district court.
In a proceeding where a “political subdivision and a person” are adverse, the court “shall
award the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses,
if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.” I.C. §
12-117(1) (emphasis added). Idaho Code § 12-117(1) expressly applies to “any proceeding”
including judicial review where a political subdivision and a person are adverse parties. Hauser
Lake Rod & Gun Club, Inc. v. City of Hauser, 162 Idaho 260, 263, 396 P.3d 689, 692 (2017); see
also Cty. Residents Against Pollution From Septage Sludge (CRAPSS) v. Bonner Cty., 138 Idaho
585, 589, 67 P.3d 64, 68 (2003) (ordering Bonner County to pay the prevailing party’s attorney’s
fees and costs in a judicial review proceeding where Bonner County failed to follow its own
ordinance and acted arbitrarily). The County is a “political subdivision” for the application of I.C.
§ 12-117 and acts through the Board. I.C. § 12-117(6)(d); Hauser Lake, 162 Idaho at 264, 396
P.3d at 693 (quoting I.C. § 31-602).
Adverse in this proceeding is a political subdivision, the County, and a person, the
Hungates. As set forth above, reversal under I.C. § 67-5279 is warranted in this case because the
County committed several blatant errors in approving the Variances and the errors prejudiced the
Hungates’ substantial rights. As such, the Hungates should have been the prevailing party below.
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In addition to being the prevailing party, the County acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law
in issuing the Decision. R. Vol. 1, pp. 177-78 (noting that the County waived any argument that
the Variances were not granted in error and that the Variances were actually granted in error
because: (1) the Board failed to analyze and apply applicable sections of the BCRC; (2) the
Decision was in violation of applicable sections of the BCRC; and (3) the Decision is not supported
by facts in the record); R. Vol. 1, pp. 106-07 (setting forth all of the specific reasons the Board
acted without a reasonable basis in factor law). The Hungates have been forced to incur significant
costs and fees to protect their property and the use thereof because of the Board’s improper
Decision. Because the Hungates are the prevailing party and Bonner County acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law, the Hungates are entitled to attorney fees and costs under I.C. § 12117.
D.

The Hungates are entitled to their attorney fees and costs on appeal under I.C. §
12-117.
Idaho Code § 12-117 provides:
[I]n any proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or a political
subdivision and a person, the state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing
the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party reasonable
attorney’s fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.

I.C. § 12-117(1) (emphasis added); see also Hauser Lake Rod & Gun Club, Inc. v. City of Hauser,
162 Idaho 260, 266, 396 P.3d 689, 695 (2017) (holding that the Rod & Gun Club, as the prevailing
party on appeal, was entitled to fees on appeal under section 12-117 because the City of Hauser
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did not act with a reasonable basis in fact or law “by attempting to enforce its code outside City
limits on the [Rod & Gun] Club, a non-resident.”)
As set forth above, adverse in this appeal is a political subdivision, the County, and a
person, the Hungates. Because the Hungates have shown that the district court erred in concluding
that the Hungates failed to establish prejudice to a substantial right, the Hungates are the prevailing
party on appeal. Furthermore, for the reasons set forth herein, and in the Hungates’ briefing to the
distrist court (R. Vol. 1, pp. 106-07), the County acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law in
issuing the Decision. The Hungates were able to articulate nine errors made by the Board, none of
which the County defended. Accordingly, the Hungates are entitled to attorney fees and costs
under I.C. § 12-117.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Hungates respectfully request this Court reverse the
district court and award the Hungates reasonable attorney fees and costs before the district court
and on appeal.
DATED: November 16, 2018.
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